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We consider an incomplete markets economy with capital accumulation and endogenous
labor supply. Individuals face countercyclical idiosyncratic labor and asset risk. We derive
conditions under which the aggregate allocations and price system can be found by solving a
representative agent problem. This result is applied to analyze the properties of an optimal
monetary policy in a New Keynesian economy with uninsured countercyclical individual
risk. The optimal monetary policy that emerges from our incomplete markets economy is
the same as the optimal monetary policy in a representative agent model with preference
shocks. When price rigidity is the only friction the optimal monetary policy calls for
stabilizing the in
ation rate at zero.
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11 Introduction
This paper establishes an aggregation theorem for a class of incomplete market economies and
uses it to analyze the properties of optimal monetary policy when markets are incomplete.
Our aggregation result is interesting because it applies to a model that captures some of the
most signicant features of the business cycle. For instance, in the data over 60 percent of the
total variation in output over the business cycle is due to variation in labor input. Labor supply
is endogenous in our model and monetary policy can aect labor market conditions.
Another property of the business cycle is that capital accumulation makes it possible for
the entire economy to insure against variations in economic activity. The signicance of this
mechanism can be easily discerned in aggregate variability statistics. Aggregate consumption is
much less volatile than output while aggregate investment is much more volatile than output.
This mechanism is operating in our economy. Capital formation is endogenous and monetary
policy can in
uence the level of investment.
A nal aspect of the business cycle that we want to model is a positive correlation between
uninsured unemployment and asset risk. For most households their single most important
investment is their home.1 In many localities labor market outcomes are related either directly
or indirectly to the economic performance of large employers. When these employers downsize
their labor force this implies both a higher probability of unemployment and also a higher
probability of lower house prices.2 We assume that idiosyncratic labor income risk is correlated
with asset return risk in our model.
Our paper makes contributions to the literature on incomplete markets models of the business
cycle. Producing a tractable real model of the private sector with endogenous labor supply and
endogenous capital formation is a challenge. In the current literature there are two approaches
to modeling the business cycle with incomplete markets. One approach uses strictly numerical
methods. The advantage of this approach is that one can model both labor supply and capital
formation. Krusell, Mukoyama, Sahin and Smith (2009), consider the welfare cost of business
cycles in a real economy with idiosyncratic, countercyclical labor risk and capital formation and
exogenous labor supply. Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001) model countercyclical risk in
a real overlapping generations model with capital formation and exogenous labor. Chang and
Kim (2007) consider labor supply decisions in an innite horizon model with capital formation
but idiosyncratic risk is acyclical.
The principal disadvantage of this approach is the curse of dimensionality. As the dimension
of either the shock space or the list of endogenous state variables is increased one quickly hits
the limits of computational feasibility. For this reason the above papers only have a single
aggregate shock and a single endogenous aggregate state variable. Deriving optimal state-
contingent government policies creates an additional layer of computational diculty, because
1Wol (2010), for instance, reports that in 2007 over 61 percent of wealth was invested in the primary residence
for the bottom 90 percent of the U.S. wealth distribution.
2See Foote, Gerardi, Goette and Willen (2010) for empirical evidence on the positive correlation between
unemployment and mortgage default risk.
2these policies are, in principle, indexed by each possible history.
An alternative strategy is to make assumptions that allow one to derive closed form or nearly
closed form results. Most of this research builds on ideas rst developed by Constantinides and
Due (1996). Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante (2008) consider the eects of an increase in
labor risk in an incomplete markets economy that admits a closed form solution. However, that
model abstracts from capital formation. Krebs (2003) computes the welfare cost of business
cycles in a model with countercyclical idiosyncratic risk and capital formation. However, his
model abstracts from labor supply. Kruger and Lustig (2010) derive conditions under which
incomplete markets are irrelevant for the price of aggregate risk. But, their result requires that
idiosyncratic risk be acyclical and they derive their result in an exchange economy.
The real side of the economy we consider extends this previous research by modeling both
labor supply and capital formation jointly. Our specication of the risk environment assumes
that the labor productivity of each individual follows a geometric random walk, and there are
no insurance markets for that risk. We assume that the return to savings of each individual
is also subject to idiosyncratic risk. Under these assumptions we establish that the no-trade
theorem of Constantinides and Due (1996) extends to our production economy with endoge-
nous labor supply. This is accomplished by producing an aggregation result that establishes
the existence of a representative-agent economy with preference shocks that yields the same ag-
gregate quantities and prices in equilibrium as the original heterogeneous-agents economy with
incomplete markets.3 Our model has the property that an increase in the variance of idiosyn-
cratic income shocks acts to increase (resp. decrease) the discount factor in the corresponding
representative-agent economy if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption is
less (resp. greater) than unity.
Motivated by recent empirical evidence documented in Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron
(2004), and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004), we model countercyclical variation in idiosyncratic
risk. Modeling countercyclical idiosyncratic risk can produce large welfare costs of business cy-
cles.4 Our model shares this property. Lucas' (1987) measure exceeds 12 percent of consumption
when the coecient of relative risk aversion is two.
We apply our aggregation result to analyze optimal monetary policy when individuals face
uninsured idiosyncratic risk in a New Keynesian model. One challenge to analyzing optimal
monetary policy in such an environment arises from the fact that Calvo price setting makes prot
maximization of each rm an intertemporal problem. When nancial markets are incomplete,
shareholders, in general, do not agree on how to value future dividends.5 In the context of the
Calvo model, this implies that when a rm obtains an opportunity to adjust the price of its
product, its shareholders do not agree about the price it should charge. In our setup there is no
disagreement problem. All shareholders value future dividends in the same way.
3For a general discussion on the correspondence between incomplete-markets economies and representative-
agent economies, see Nakajima (2005).
4See, for instance, Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001), Krebs (2003) and De Santis (2007).
5For an overview on the theory of incomplete markets, see, for instance, Magill and Quinzii (1996).
3In this paper we focus on sticky prices, and abstract from sticky wages.6 As is well known,
complete price stabilization achieves the rst best in the representative-agent New Keynesian
model with sticky prices, provided that the average distortion due to monopolistic competition
among intermediate goods producers is corrected by a subsidy.7 Using our aggregation result
we establish that price stabilization is also optimal in our incomplete markets model. This is
true in spite of the fact that the welfare cost of business cycles is far larger than in the standard
representative-agent New Keynesian model.
The intuition for this result is as follows. In our model there are two ways that government
policy can improve on laissez faire allocations. One way is to enhance productive eciency by
correcting the dynamic markup distortion. The other way is to provide insurance either via
direct redistribution or indirect redistribution. Direct redistribution falls within the domain of
scal policy, and thus we rule out this possibility. Indirect redistribution involves manipulating
the price system in a way that benets households who experience negative idiosyncratic shocks
and thus provides them with implicit insurance. An implication of our aggregation result is that
the objective function of a benevolent monetary authority factors in such a way that there is
no opportunity for it to in
uence the conditional distribution of wealth and provide this type
of implicit insurance. It follows that the optimal monetary policy in our incomplete markets
economy is to stabilize the price level when there is a subsidy to intermediate goods producers
that corrects the steady state distortion.
Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007) show that the optimal monetary policy obtained in the
New Keynesian model with complete markets continues to call for (nearly) complete price sta-
bilization when there is no such subsidy. In our model the fact that the objective function
factors continues to imply that there is no opportunity for the monetary authority to provide
implicit insurance by aecting relative prices. Still, the representative agent representation
of our incomplete markets model is dierent from the complete markets economy considered
by Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007). We have preference discount shocks that are correlated
with the aggregate state of technology and they don't. The welfare costs of business cycles are
also large in our model but small in theirs. It turns out that these dierences are innocuous.
Complete stabilization of the price level is a good policy in our incomplete markets model too.
In the Appendix we consider a more elaborate model costly price and wage adjustment.
This second nominal rigidity creates a tradeo between price stabilization, on the one hand,
and wage stabilization on the other hand. Our main nding applies in this setting too. The
optimal monetary policy that emerges from our incomplete markets economy is the same that
would apply in the analogue representative agent model.8
More generally, our results suggest that conclusions about optimal monetary policy in rep-
resentative agent models are robust to the market structure in the following sense. If one posits
shocks to the preference discount rate and allows them to be correlated with aggregate shocks
6The appendix considers an extension with both types of price adjustment.
7See, for instance, Woodford (2003) and Gal  (2008).
8As pointed out in e.g. Gal  (2008) the optimal monetary policy no longer calls for stabilizing the price level.
4then the optimal policies can also be construed as being the optimal policies that emerge in a
particular model of incomplete markets.
Finally, our model provides structural foundations for preference discount shifters. Prefer-
ence discount shifters have been found to be important shocks in the New Keynesian models
of Smets and Wouters (2003), Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams (2005), and Burriel,
Fern andez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ram rez (2009) among others. Our model explicitly links the
persistence and variability of movements in the preference discount rate to the law of motion of
the variance of idiosyncratic risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our heterogeneous-
agents economy, and then construct a corresponding representative-agent economy which yields
the same equilibrium as the original economy. In Section 3, we present our numerical results.
In Section 4, we conclude.
2 The model economy
In this section we describe our model. It is a cashless New Keynesian economy (see Wood-
ford (2003) or Gal  (2008)) with nominal price rigidities as in Calvo (1983) and uninsurable
idiosyncratic individual risk.
2.1 Individuals
The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals of unit measure, indexed by i 2 [0;1].
They are subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. We assume that idiosyncratic
shocks are independent across individuals, and a law of large numbers applies.
Individuals consume and invest a composite good, which is produced by a continuum of
dierentiated products, indexed by j 2 [0;1]. If the supply of each variety is given by Yj;t, for












where  > 1 denotes the elasticity of substitution across dierent varieties. This composite good
is used for consumption and investment:
Yt = Ct + It
where Ct and It denote the aggregate amounts of consumption and investment in period t,
respectively. Let Pj;t denote the price of variety j in period t. It then follows from cost

















Preferences of each individual are described by the utility function dened over stochastic













where  is a subjective discount factor, ci;t is individual i's consumption of the composite good
in period t, and li;t is her labor supply in period t. We use Ei
t to denote the expectation operator
conditional on the history of idiosyncratic shocks to individual i up to and including period t
as well as the history of aggregate shocks over the same time period. The expectation operator
conditional on the history of aggregate shocks up to and including period t is denoted by Et. It
will prove convenient to dene 
c as

c  1   (1   
) (5)
Then, 1=
c is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption with a constant level
of leisure.
The idiosyncratic risk faced by individual i is represented by a geometric random walk fi;tg:





where ;i;t is N(0;1) and i.i.d. across individuals and over time. The standard deviation, ;t,
is allowed to 
uctuate over time, in a way that will be specied below. The process fi;tg aects
individual i's income in two ways. First, i;t aects the productivity of individual i's labor (her
eciency units of labor). Thus, if wt is the real wage rate per eciency unit of labor, the labor
income of individual i in period t is given by wti;tli;t. Second, i;t aects the return on savings.
We will abstract from government bonds. Suppose that claims to the ownership of physical
capital and the ownership of rms are traded separately. Let qj;t be the period-t price of a
share in rm j 2 [0;1], and ei;j;t be the share in rm j held by individual i at the end of
period t. Below we conjecture an equilibrium in which all individuals choose the same portfolio
weights, and hence they hold equal shares of all rms, that is, ei;j;t = ei;t for all j 2 [0;1]. We
then verify that such an equilibrium exists. Let si;t be the value of stocks held by individual
i: si;t 
R 1
0 qj;tei;j;t dj = ei;t
R 1
0 qj;t dj, and let Rs;t be the gross rate of return on equities:
Rs;t 
R 1
0 (qj;t + dj;t)dj=
R 1
0 qj;t 1 dj.
Under our assumption that the return to savings is also subject to idiosyncratic risk, the

ow budget constraint becomes
ci;t + ki;t + si;t =
i;t
i;t 1
(Rk;tki;t 1 + Rs;tsi;t 1) + i;twtli;t (7)
6Here ki;t is the amount of physical capital obtained by individual i in period t, and Rk;t is the
gross rate of return on physical capital, that is,
Rk;t = 1    + rk;t (8)
where rk;t is the rental rate of capital and  is its depreciation rate. To rule out Ponzi schemes,
we impose ki;t  0 and si;t  0. These last two constraints will not bind in equilibrium.9
In equation (7), i;t=i;t 1 is an idiosyncratic shock to the return on savings. Under this
assumption \permanent income" of individual i, which is dened as the sum of human and
nancial wealth, is proportional to i;t.
The assumption that the idiosyncratic risk to labor and capital income is perfectly correlated
is strong but it buys us a lot. Under this assumption we are able to derive a tractable solution
to what, is in general, a challenging model to solve and analyze. This assumption also strikes
us as empirically relevant. As we noted in the introduction home ownership creates a positive
correlation between labor risk and nancial risk. Labor and nancial risks are also likely to be
positively correlated for privately held rms as in Angeletos (2007).
At date 0, each individual chooses a contingent plan fci;t;li;t;ki;t;si;tg so as to maximize her
utility (4) given fki; 1;si; 1;i; 1g and subject to the sequence of 
ow budget constraints (7)
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i;t (1   li;t)(1 )(1 


























0ti;tsi;t = 0 (14)
9Constantinides and Due (1996) show that in equilibrium agents never choose to borrow. Our economy has
this same property.
10Note that we are allowing for ex ante heterogeneity.
7Given a vector stochastic process fRk;t;Rs;t;wtg, a solution to the utility maximization
problem of each individual is a state-contingent plan fci;t;li;t;ki;t;si;t;i;tg that satises the
rst-order conditions (7)-(12), as well as the transversality conditions (13)-(14) and the initial
conditions.
2.2 Aggregation
Here we show that the utility maximization problem of the heterogeneous agents under incom-
plete markets described in the previous subsection can be aggregated into a utility maximization
problem of a representative agent. The key insight in our aggregation result is to recognize that
the presence of uninsured idiosyncratic risk induces stochastic shocks to the utility function of
the representative agent as in Nakajima (2005).










t (1   Lt)1 1 

(15)
where Ct is the amount of consumption of the composite good dened in (1) in period t, and L
is the amount of labor supply in period t. Here, t is the preference shock to the representative















c is dened in (5), and ;t is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock in period










where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on the history of aggregate shocks up to
and including period t.
Suppose that the representative agent faces the following 
ow budget constraint:
Ct + Kt + St = Rk;tKt 1 + Rs;tSt 1 + wtLt (17)
and initial conditions K 1;S 1 > 0. Here Kt and St are the amount of physical capital and
the value of stocks held by the representative agent in period t. We assume the short-selling
constraints: Kt;St  0. These two constraints do not bind in equilibrium. Given prices and
the initial condition, the representative agent chooses a contingent plan fCt;Lt;Kt;Stg so as to
maximize lifetime utility U0 in (15) subject to the sequence of 
ow budget constraints (17) and
short-selling constraints.
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+ t [Rk;tKt 1 + Rs;tSt 1 + wtLt   Ct   Kt   St]
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along with the 
ow budget constraint (17). The transversality condition for Kt and St are,
respectively,
E0tttKt = 0 (22)
E0tttSt = 0 (23)
Given the initial conditions K 1 and S 1, a solution to the utility maximization problem of
the representative agent is given by fCt;Lt;Kt;St;tg that satises the rst-order conditions
(17)-(21), as well as the transversality conditions (22)-(23).
The next proposition establishes that the solution to the utility maximization problem of the
representative agent, and the solution to the utility maximization problem of each individual
described in the previous subsection are the same.
Proposition 1. Given stochastic processes fRk;t;Rs;t;wt;;tg and initial conditions fK 1;S 1g,
consider the utility maximization problem of individual i described in the previous subsection







t=0 is a solution to the representative agent's problem. For
each i 2 [0;1], suppose that the initial conditions have the following form:
R 1
0 i; 1 = 1,




















t=0 is a solution to the problem of individual i.







t=0 is a solution to the representative agent's problem. Then
it satises the rst-order conditions, (17)-(21), as well as the transversality conditions, (22)-(23).














Then it is straightforward to see that these satisfy the rst-order conditions, (7), (9)-(12), and
the transversality conditions, (13)-(14), for the problem of individual i. This completes the
proof.
Proposition 1 applies in a setting where agents are ex ante homogeneous i; 1 =  1. But
it also applies in situations where there are ex ante dierences among individuals. This second
setting will be of interest when we consider the optimal monetary policy problem below.
Proposition 1 also has a number of important implications. First, individual labor allocations
are identical across all agents. Note also that
ci;t
i; 1 is i.i.d. across agents in all periods as in
e.g. Constantinides and Due (1996), Krebs (2003), and Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante
9(2008). It follows from these two properties that, in equilibrium, the utility function of the
representative agent (15) is proportionate to the cross-sectional average of individual utility






































































Second, by appealing to Proposition 1, it is possible to see in a very transparent way how the
size of idiosyncratic shocks, ;t, aect the aggregate dynamics of the economy. Let us dene
the \eective discount factor" between periods t and t + 1, ~ t;t+1, as













where the second equality follows from (16). This expression illustrates that the presence of
idiosyncratic shocks (;t > 0) makes the eective discount factor higher if 
c > 1 and lower
if 
c < 1. These results are associated with relative prudence, which is 1 + 
c here. As is well
known, if relative prudence is greater (less) than 2 the demand for a risky asset will increase
(decrease) with the risk of the asset (see e.g. Gollier (2001)). This eect is re
ected here in the
relationship between the eective discount factor ~ t;t+1 and the size of the idiosyncratic risk
2
;t+1 in (25). Note also that cyclical 
uctuations in the variance of idiosyncratic shocks, 2
;t,
induce cyclical variations in the eective discount factor ~ t;t+1.
Generally speaking, in incomplete markets economies agents have dierent consumptions
and thus price future cash 
ows in dierent ways.11 A third implication of Proposition 1 though
is that in our economy individuals agree on the present value of future dividends of each rm.
This is due to the fact that the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for each individual is
independent of the history of idiosyncratic shocks. To see this, note that the stochastic discount

























Since ;i;t+1 is i.i.d. across individuals and independent of the stochastic shocks faced by each
rm, all individuals value a given future payo in the same way. In particular, we can use the
stochastic discount factor of the representative agent, t+1t+1=(tt), to value future dividend
streams of rms.
11See e.g. Magill and Quinzii (1996) for a discussion on this point.
10Finally, note that the fact that agents agree about the value of each rm under the allocations
described in Proposition 1 also implies that our initial assumption that individuals hold equal
shares of all rms, ei;j;t = ei;t for all j 2 [0;1], is indeed consistent with utility maximization of
each individual.12
2.3 Firms
The production side of our economy is standard in the New Keynesian literature and similar
to the one considered by Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007). Each dierentiated product is pro-







j;t   t (26)
where zt is the aggregate productivity shock, Kj;t is the physical capital used by rm j in period
t, Lj;t is its labor input, and t is the xed cost of production. The market clearing conditions
for capital and labor are
Z 1
0
Kj;t dj = Kt 1; and
Z 1
0
Lj;t dj = Lt
Here, note that the stock of capital available for production in period t is Kt 1. The processes
for zt and t are specied in the next subsection.
Consider the cost minimization problem of rm j:
min
Kj;t;Lj;t





j;t   t = Yj;t
Since, all rms choose the same capital labor ratio, the rst-order conditions of their cost-
minimization problems are identical













where mct is marginal cost which is given by:






The price of each variety is adjusted in a sluggish way as in Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996).
For each rm, the opportunity to change the price of its product arrives with probability 1   
in each period. This random event occurs independently across rms (it is also independent of
all other stochastic shocks in our economy). Without such an opportunity, a rm must charge
the same price as in the previous period. Suppose that rm j obtains an opportunity to change




















12We do not pursue this here but in principle there could be other equilibria in which portfolios dier across
individuals.
11where st+st+s=(tt) is the stochastic discount factor used to evaluate (real) payos in period
t + s in units of consumption in period t.
All rms with the opportunity to change their prices will choose the same price, so denote

































































It is convenient to express x1
t and x2
t in a recursive fashion:
x1









where t+1 is the gross in




Since all rms that adjust their prices in a given period choose the same new price, ~ Pt,





t 1 + (1   ) ~ P
1 
t
which can be rewritten as
1 = 
 1+
t + (1   )~ p
1 
t (32)




















t   t (33)









The evolution of &t can be written as





The aggregate consumption, investment and capital stock satisfy
Yt = Ct + It (35)
Kt = It + (1   )Kt 1 (36)
2.4 Aggregate shocks
We consider two specications of the aggregate productivity shock. One specication we consider
is a permanent productivity shock. In particular, we assume that zt follows a geometric random
walk:





and the xed cost of production, t, grows at the rate :
t = exp(t) (38)
where  and z are constant parameters, and z;t is N(0;1) and i.i.d. across periods. The other
specication we consider is a temporary but persistent productivity shock. We assume that zt
follows an AR(1) process:





and that the xed cost is constant:
t =  (40)
For both specications, the constant  is calibrated so that the aggregate prot is zero in the
non-stochastic steady state (balanced growth path) with zero in
ation.
The standard deviation of innovations to individual labor productivity, ;t, is also an aggre-
gate shock. It acts like a preference discount rate shock to the representative agent. Evidence
provided by Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) suggests
that idiosyncratic risk is countercyclical. Krebs (2003) and De Santis (2007) have found that
13the welfare cost of business cycles can be sizable with countercyclical idiosyncratic risk. The
only other aggregate shock in our economy is a shock to the aggregate state of technology. If we
allow for a negative correlation between ;t and the aggregate technology shock, idiosyncratic
risk will be countercyclical.13 Specically, when the evolution of the aggregate productivity is
given by (37), we assume that the variance of idiosyncratic shocks evolves as
2
;t =  2
 + bzz;t (41)
and when zt follows the temporary process given by (39), we assume that
2
;t =  2
 + blnzt (42)
An important dierence between the two specications of technology shocks is that 2
;t is
serially correlated in (42) but not in (41). By combining equation (41) or alternatively (42) with
equation (25) one can show that the eective preference discount factor inherits these properties.
Under the specication with permanent shocks it is given by:





c   1)( 2
 + bzz;t+1) (43)
And under the assumption of temporary but persistent shocks it is





c   1)( 2
 + blnzt+1) (44)
From these two equations we can see that the law of motion of the eective discount factor for
the representative agent has an explicit link to the law of motion of the variance of idiosyncratic
shocks. In this sense our model provides explicit micro-foundations for shocks to the subjective
discount factor that have been found to be an important source of business cycle variation in the
New Keynesian models of Smets and Wouters (2003), Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams
(2005), and Burriel, Fern andez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ram rez (2009) among others. Although
we don't pursue this here one could investigate the extent to which the estimates that are based
on macro data in these papers are consistent with micro observations. One could also investigate
how imposing the cross-equation restrictions that emerge from our model aect the properties
of the estimated parameters in these other representative agents economies and the signicance
of this type of shock in accounting for business cycle 
uctuations.
2.5 Monetary policy
Government policy is very simple in our economy. First, we abstract from scal policy: the
government does not consume, and there are no government bonds or taxes. Second, we assume
that the monetary authority can directly control the in
ation rate. Thus, monetary policy is
specied as a state contingent path of the in
ation rate, ftg1
t=0.
13We are not asserting anything here about the direction of causality. We are following the literature we cited
above and abstracting from a formal model that links idiosyncratic risk to the level of aggregate technology. But
we can imagine situations in which the causality goes in either direction.
142.6 Denition of equilibrium
The denition of equilibrium for the economy proceeds in two steps. First we dene an equilib-
rium for the representative agent economy. That equilibrium determines aggregate allocations
and prices. Then in a second step we show how to derive the individual allocations.
Denition 1. A representative agent equilibrium consists of a set of stochastic processes for
fCt;Lt;Kt;It;Yt;St;t;mct;wt;rt;Rs;t;Rk;t;x1
t;x2
t; ~ pt;&tg that satisfy equations (8), (17), (18),
(19), (20), (21), (27), (28), (29), (30), (31), (32), (33), (34), (35), and (36) and the transver-
sality conditions (22) and (23) for given fK 1;& 1g, laws of motion for the exogenous shocks
and monetary policy, ftg1
t=0.
The aggregate allocations from the representative agent equilibrium can be used to derive the
individual allocations in the following way. Under the assumption of Proposition 1, the initial
wealth distribution is given by: ki; 1 = i; 1K 1 and si; 1 = i; 1S 1. Then Proposition 1
implies that the individual allocations for t = 0;1;2;::: are given by ci;t = i;tCt, li;t = Lt,




2.7 Optimal monetary policy
We consider optimal \Ramsey" monetary policies, where a benevolent monetary authority pre-
commits to a state-contingent path of the in
ation rate so as to maximize a weighted average
of utility of individuals subject to the restriction that the resulting allocation can be supported
as a competitive equilibrium. In the discussion that follows we will explicitly rule out policies
such as agent-specic lump-sum transfers or labor or capital taxation. All of these policies fall
in the realm of scal policy.
Let i denote the Pareto weights which are assumed to be positive 8i and satisfy
R
i idi = 1.






















Generally speaking, the Ramsey planner chooses individual allocations and it is necessary to
impose all of the competitive equilibrium restrictions simultaneously. However, the competitive
allocations in our economy have two properties that allow us to also factor the objective function
into two parts. First, in equilibrium all individuals make identical labor supply decisions, li;t =
Lt. Second,
ci;t
i; 1 is i.i.d. across individuals in all periods. Both of these properties follow from
Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. For all choices of i that satisfy i > 0;8i and
R
i idi = 1 the objective function
for the Ramsey planner's problem is U0 in (15).





















































Observe that the term in parenthesis in the nal line is a constant that is independent of
policy.
From the proof we can see that individuals are both ex ante and ex post dierent. For
our Ramsey planner, who must honor the restrictions of an incomplete markets equilibrium,
these dierences get re
ected in the constant term. All agents face the same distribution of
future consumption growth at all points of time and are proportional to each other. Thus, any
manipulation of the price system will aect all agents in the same way. It follows that there is
no opportunity for the monetary authority to aect equity in this incomplete markets economy.
Proposition 2 makes it possible to solve for the optimal monetary policy using the same two
step procedure that we used to solve the competitive equilibrium. First, we solve a representative
agent Ramsey problem. Then in a second step we derive the individual allocations.
Denition 2. The representative agent Ramsey problem is to maximize U0 in (15) by choice
of the in
ation rate ftg subject to (8), (17), (18), (19), (20), (21), (27), (28), (29), (30),
(31), (32), (33), (34), (35), and (36) and the transversality conditions (22) and (23) for given
fK 1;& 1g, and laws of motion for the exogenous shocks.
Note that conditional on a choice of ftg, the remaining equilibrium prices and aggregate
quantities are indirectly determined via the constraints. Then the individual allocations can be
derived using the same strategy described in the denition of equilibrium above. There is a well
known time consistency issue in this class of problem. In the numerical analysis that follows we
consider the optimal policy from the timeless perspective as proposed by Woodford (2003).
3 Results
In this section we analyze how the presence of idiosyncratic shocks aects the properties of the
optimal monetary policy. We are particularly interested in the case where the idiosyncratic risk,
;t, 
uctuates countercyclically. We show that even though countercyclical idiosyncratic risk
makes the welfare cost of business cycles sizable, properties of the optimal monetary policy are
little aected by the presence of idiosyncratic shocks. Namely, the optimal monetary policy is
roughly characterized as the zero-in
ation policy.
163.1 Analytic results
Let us rst consider the case where scal policy eliminates the monopoly distortion at the zero-
in
ation steady state as in Woodford (2003) and Gal  (2008). Specically, suppose that each
monopolist's revenue is subsidized at a rate , that the subsidies are nanced by lump-sum
taxes, Tt, on monopolists, and that there are no xed costs,  = 0. Then, net of the tax and














then the monopoly distortion is eliminated at the zero-in
ation steady state. Let the stochastic
processes for fztg and f2
;tg be given either by (37) and (41), or by (39) and (42), respectively.
Now consider our model with heterogeneous agents under incomplete markets. Market in-
completeness introduces a new distortion and thus, in principle, the possibility that there might
be a trade o for monetary policy between correcting this distortion and the distortions that
arise from costly price adjustment and imperfect competition. However, from Proposition 1 we
know that our incomplete markets economy has a representative agent representation in which
there are shocks to technology and preferences. It then follows using exactly the same reasoning
as Woodford (2003) and Gal  (2008) that price stabilization is the optimal monetary policy.
Proposition 3. Assume that subsidies to the monopolists are given at the rate  = 1
 1, which
are nanced by lump-sum taxes on the monopolists. Suppose also that the economy is initially
at the zero-in
ation steady state. Then the solution to the Ramsey problem is given by
t = 1;
at all dates, under all contingencies and for all Pareto weights.
3.2 Quantitative results
Now let us now consider the case with no subsidy:  = Tt = 0. With the monopoly distortion,
setting the in
ation rate to zero at all dates is no longer optimal. The main question asked in
this subsection is how dierent the optimal monetary policy is from the zero-in
ation policy.
The answer to this question is not immediately obvious. On the one hand, the results we
have describe above show that there are no opportunities for an optimal monetary policy to
aect equity. However, the same opportunities to enhance eciency that arise in representative
agent models are also present here. Moreover, there is an important dierence between our
representative agent specication and that considered by e.g. Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007).
The eective preference discount factor is correlated with the technology shock and the nature
of this dependence varies with the value of 
c and the law of motion of idiosyncratic risk. It
17turns out that this distinction can have a rst order impact on the welfare cost of business cycles
when the variance of idiosyncratic risk is countercyclical. This result occurs when we use an
individual's utility function to assess the welfare. From equation (24) we can see that this result
also applies when we use the utility function of the representative agent to evaluate welfare.
The parameter values of our model are calibrated as follows. One period in the model
corresponds to a quarter. The share of capital is  = 0:36, and the depreciation rate is  = 0:02.
These are taken from Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001). The probability of price adjustment
is set to 0.2, i.e.,  = 0:8 and the elasticity of substitution across dierent varieties of products
is  = 5, following Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007). The xed cost of production,  , is set so
that the prot of each rm at the non-stochastic steady state under optimal monetary policy is
zero. The discount factor  is chosen so that the real interest rate at the non-stochastic steady
state is four percent a year. For the preference parameter, we consider two values for 
c, 0.7
and 2. For each value of 
c, another preference parameter  is set so that the labor supply
at the stochastic steady state is one third (then, 
 is determined as 
 = 1   (1   
c)=). For
the case of permanent productivity shock (37), we follow Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001)
and set  = 0:004, and z = 0:018. For the case of a temporary productivity shock (39), we
follow Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007)14 and set z = 0:8556 and z = 0:0064=(1   ). For
the idiosyncratic shock process, we follow De Santis (2007) and set   = 0:1=2 and b = 0 or
b =  0:8. It turns out that as long as we adjust  so as to keep the steady state interest rate
xed (i.e., four percent a year), the value of  does not matter. When b = 0, the idiosyncratic
risk is acyclical; when b =  0:8, it is countercyclical. De Santis (2007) chooses b =  0:8 based
on the evidence provided by Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004).
In what follows, we compare dynamics of dierent versions of our model economy, which
dier in terms of the risk aversion parameter, 
c 2 f0:7;2g; the cyclicality of the idiosyncratic
risk, b 2 f0; 0:8g; the persistence of the aggregate productivity shock, (37) and (39); or the
monetary policy: Ramsey and zero in
ation-targeting. In addition, for each value of 
c and b,
and for each process for zt, we compute two normative measures of welfare costs.
The rst one is the welfare cost of business cycles as originally estimated by Lucas (1987).
Specically, we consider the real-business-cycle version of our model, in which there are no
nominal rigidities, and compare the economy with positive aggregate shocks, z > 0, and the
economy without aggregate shocks, z = 0. In both cases we assume that there are idiosyncratic
shocks,   > 0. We also assume that both economies are at the non-stochastic steady state prior
to date 0 and compare the welfare conditional on the state vector at t =  1.15 Let Xt denote
the vector of the state variables, and let  X denote its value at the non-stochastic steady state.
Further, let fCrbc
t ;Lrbc
t g denote the equilibrium process of aggregate consumption and labor
supply in the RBC version of our economy, and let f  C;  Lg denote their values in the steady
14Note that the productivity level zt in Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007) corresponds to our z1 
t , so that
their standard deviation must be adjusted by 1=(1   ).
15In this sense, we are measuring conditional welfare costs. Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2007) discuss a related
issue.
18state. Then, dene lifetime utility evaluated at period t =  1 by









t )(1   Lrbc
t )1 1 

where t is given by (16). The corresponding value for the non-stochastic economy is given by
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where  t is dened by
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((1   bc)  C)(1    L)1 1 

= V (  X;z;rbc)
that is,
bc = 1  

V (  X;z;rbc)




The second welfare cost measure is the cost of adopting a non-optimal policy (the zero
in
ation-targeting policy) as opposed to the optimal monetary policy (the Ramsey policy).
Somewhat abusing notation, we again use  X to denote the non-stochastic steady state under
the Ramsey policy. It turns out that the steady-state in
ation rate under the Ramsey policy is
zero. Therefore,  X is also the non-stochastic steady state associated with the in
ation-targeting
policy. Suppose that the economy is at the steady state  X prior to date 0. Then the welfare
cost of the in
ation-targeting policy, inf, is given as
inf = 1  

V (  X;z;inf)




where V (  X;z;inf) and V (  X;z;ram) are the lifetime utility associated with the in
ation-
targeting and Ramsey monetary policies, respectively.
3.2.1 The specication with permanent productivity shocks
Table 1 reports the welfare cost of business cycles, bc, for 
c = 0:7;2 and for b = 0; 0:8.
When risk aversion is relatively low, 
c = 0:7, the welfare cost of business cycles is negative.
That is, expected utility is higher when z > 0 than when z = 0. Furthermore, in this case,
making the idiosyncratic risk countercyclical decreases the welfare cost of business cycles. That
is, it increases the welfare gain of business cycles.
These results are similar in nature to a previous nding by Cho and Cooley (2005). They
show that a mean-preserving increase of the variance of technology shocks can improve welfare.
19To see why, remember that the indirect utility function of a consumer is quasi-convex in prices,
and note that technology shocks create 
uctuations in the wage rate, i.e., the price of leisure. Of
course, the quasi-convexity of the indirect utility function is a partial-equilibrium property. But
if this eect is strong enough, increasing the variance of the technology shock makes it possible
for agents to concentrate their work eort in periods where their labor productivity is highest,
which increases welfare.
On the other hand, when the relative risk aversion is higher, 
c = 2, the welfare cost of
business cycles is positive. Cyclical 
uctuations in ;t act to increase the welfare costs of
business cycles. When 
c = 2 and b =  0:8, the welfare cost of business cycles is about 7.3
percent of consumption, which is a sizable amount.
Table 1 also reports the welfare cost of adopting a strict zero in
ation-targeting policy.
Observe that the welfare cost of adopting the in
ation-targeting policy is negligible for all
values of 
c and b. Even when 
c = 2 and b =  0:8, it is only 0.0006 percent. For purposes of
comparison the welfare cost of business cycles is 7.3 percent for that case. In this sense, under
permanent productivity shocks, cyclical 
uctuations in the idiosyncratic risk do not change the
nature of the optimal monetary policy even when the welfare cost of business cycles is large.
3.2.2 The specication with temporary productivity shocks
Now consider the case where productivity shocks are temporary but persistent. Then the process
for zt is given by (39), and the variance of idiosyncratic shocks follows the process given by (42).
This specication diers from the specication in the previous subsection in two important ways.
First, the productivity process (39) is stationary. Second, since lnzt is autocorrelated, so is ;t.
This introduces predictable variability in idiosyncratic risk, and thus, to the eective discount
factor, which was i.i.d. in the previous subsection.
Specically, the eective discount factor is now given by






Its conditional expectation then becomes













uctuates over time. Indeed, when 
c < 1 and b < 0, the productivity shock today
increases zt as well as the expected value of the eective discount factor, Et[ln ~ t;t+1]. On the
other hand, when 
c > 1 and b < 0, the shock increasing zt decreases Et[ln ~ t;t+1].
Table 2 shows the welfare costs of business cycles, bc, for 
c = 0:7;2 and for b = 0; 0:8.
As opposed to the case of permanent shocks in the previous subsection, when b = 0, bc is
negative for the both values of 
c. In addition, its absolute value is much smaller. As in the
permanent-shock case, countercyclical idiosyncratic risk increases the welfare gain of business
cycles for 
c = 0:7, and increases the welfare cost of business cycles when 
c = 2.
When 
c = 2 and b =  0:8, the welfare cost of business cycles is sizable (12.2 percent), even
though the productivity process is stationary. Note that the welfare costs of business cycles for
20this specication are about 5 percent larger than the case with permanent technology shocks. To
see why the welfare costs are larger here consider a temporary negative shock to technology. If
we abstract from variations in the preference discount factor the welfare costs of business cycles
would be smaller in the presence of persistent but stationary technology shocks as compared
to the case of permanent technology shocks. However, when technology shocks are stationary
and persistent a negative technology shock has a second eect. It also increases the eective
preference discount factor in a persistent way (see (44)). This second eect increases individuals'
saving motives in a bad state and this acts to exacerbate consumption variations.
The welfare costs of price stabilization continue to be small when technology shocks are
stationary. Comparing Table 2 with Table 1 we see that the welfare costs are larger when risk
aversion is 2 and idiosyncratic risk is countercyclical. This is due to the persistent response of
the eective discount factor. However, the size of the welfare cost of price stabilization is still
quite small (0.0024 percent).
To summarize, with countercyclical idiosyncratic shocks, the welfare cost of business cycles
can be sizable. However, this does not aect how monetary policy should be conducted. The
optimal monetary policy is essentially a policy that stabilizes the in
ation rate at zero.
3.2.3 The individual eects of cyclical variation in technology and variation in
idiosyncratic risk
We have seen in Tables 1 and 2 that variation in technology and variation in idiosyncratic
risk play distinct roles in our results and these roles vary with the persistence of the shocks
to the eective discount factor. To further explore the eects of these two shocks consider
Table 3 which reports results for a scenario where the eective discount factor is assumed to
follow (43) or alternatively (44) but where variation in z;t or zt are not allowed to aect the
state of technology. In terms of the original incomplete-markets economy, we are considering a
situation where the variance of idiosyncratic risk 
uctuates over time, but the aggregate state
of technology is constant.
The rst column of Table 3 reports results for the specication where the eective discount
factor is given by (43) and thus i.i.d. Under this assumption cyclical variation in idiosyncratic
risk produces negligible costs of business cycles. The costs of pursuing strict in
ation targeting
are also tiny. This is quite striking because from Table 1 we know that the combination of
variation in technology and countercyclical variation in risk produces large costs of business
cycles as compared to the case where there is only variation in technology. Thus, in this case,
we need both shocks to generate a sizable cost of business cycles. To see this, note that the
specication (43) implies that the inequality shock z;t only aects ~ t 1;t, the eective discount
factor between t 1 and t. Future discount factors, ~ s;s+1 for s  t, are not aected. Since z;t
does not aect technology in this experiment, it does not have a rst-order eect on individuals'
choices made in period t. That is, in this case, the cost of business cycles is small because
business cycles generated by fz;tg are very small.
Consider now the case where the eective discount factor follows (44) and is thus persistent.
21For this specication cyclical variation in idiosyncratic risk is very important. Now the costs of
business cycles are quite large. They are 11 percent when there is only cyclical variation in the
eective discount factor as compared to 12 percent when there is also variation in the state of
technology. Thus, in this specication, 
uctuations in the state of technology are not essential
to produce the sizable cost of business cycles. In addition, the welfare costs of in
ation-targeting
actually increase. However, the overall size of the costs of in
ation targeting continue to be very
small (0.0075 percent).
In terms of the cost of business cycles, what distinguishes the two cases in Table 3 is whether
or not the eective discount factor is serially correlated. Consider (44) in which zt is serially
correlated. In this case the eective discount factor is also serially correlated. In particular,
when 
c > 1, an increase in inequality in period t (i.e., an increase in zt) raises both ~ t 1;t and
the expected value of ~ t;t+1. The rise in the expected value of ~ t;t+1 tends to reduce consumption
today, Ct, and thus lowers the period-t utility 
ow. On the other hand, the increase in ~ t 1;t
increases the weight on the period-t utility 
ow in the lifetime utility evaluation. Thus, a rise in
inequality in period t lowers the current utility 
ow and, at the same time, increases its weight
in the lifetime utility, which tends to make a recession a more miserable event. This is why
we have a sizable cost of business cycles in this case even though the aggregate productivity is
made constant. We can see that the serial correlation in the eective discount factor is crucial
in this argument. Without it, a rise in inequality in period t would not cause a decline in Ct.
4 Conclusion
We conclude by brie
y discussing the robustness of our results to some of our modeling as-
sumptions. We have limited attention to technology shocks. Gal  and Rabanal (2004) provide
empirical evidence that suggests that technology shocks are not an important source of business
cycle 
uctuations. It is straightforward to extend the model to allow for other aggregate shocks
to the markup, and/or government purchases. If either of these shocks is correlated with the
variance of idiosyncratic risk instead, our results will still go through.
In this paper we have focused on sticky prices. With sticky wages, however, stabilizing the
price level ceases to be optimal even in the representative agent framework. In the Appendix we
extend our basic model to incorporate sticky wages show that our aggregation result still holds.
There, the optimal monetary policy no longer takes the form of price-level stabilization, but the
optimal monetary policy for the incomplete markets economy is still identical to the optimal
monetary policy in the corresponding representative agent economy with preference shocks.
We have also assumed that the shock to labor and capital income is perfectly correlated.
Reducing this correlation from one enhances the ability of individuals to self insure against
either type of risk and thus reduces the need for implicit insurance. However, at the same time,
when this correlation is reduced government policy has dierential eects on individuals. This
opens up the possibility for government policy to provide insurance by manipulating the price
system.
22Finally, we have followed the convention in the New Keynesian literature and abstracted from
modeling the demand for money. This abstraction facilitates the derivation of our aggregation
result. However, it also rules out a channel for monetary policy to aect household decisions.
In
ation is not a tax that aects labor supply in the cashless New Keynesian economy.
5 Appendix: Adding sticky wages
In this Appendix we generalize our benchmark model to allow for both sticky prices and sticky
wages. The setting we consider closely follows the sticky-wage model of Schmitt-Groh e and
Uribe (2005). However, we extend their model to allow for heterogeneous agents.














But now assume that an individual supplies a continuum of dierentiated labor services j 2 [0;1].





where li;t(j) is the amount of type-j labor supplied by individual i. As in the benchmark model,
individuals dier in terms of their labor productivity, i;t. In terms of eciency units, the supply
of type-j labor of individual i in period t is i;tli;t(j) for all j 2 [0;1].
The production technology and the model of price adjustment of each rm is the same as
in the benchmark model but we now assume that rms use a composite labor input made from

















where ~  is the elasticity of substitution across dierent labor services, and Hn;t(j) is the amount





In the above expression li;n;t(j) denotes the amount of type-j labor supplied by individual i to
rm n in period t.
The nominal wage rate of type-j labor is given by Wt(j), and wt(j)  Wt(j)=Pt the real





















In each period, wage rates and hours worked are determined by the \labor union," as in
Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe (2005), among others. The nominal wage rate of each type of labor,
Wt(j), is set by the union in the Calvo way. In each period, each nominal wage rate is adjusted
with probability (1   ~ ). If Wt(j) is not adjusted in period t, then it is equal to its value in the
previous period, i.e., Wt(j) = Wt 1(j). In each labor market j, the union takes Ht and Wt as
exogenous. Given the wage rates, Wt(j), the union next sets hours worked for each individual
so as to satisfy the demands for each type of labor. For simplicity, we assume that the union
allocates hours worked equally across individuals, that is,
li;t(j) = Lt(j); for all i 2 [0;1].
Since the cross-sectional average of i;t is unity for each period t, it follows from (48) that
Z 1
0
Hn;t(j)dn = Lt(j); for each i 2 [0;1].







It follows that the utility maximization problem for each individual is the same as in the
benchmark model except that he/she no longer chooses hours worked by himself/herself. As
in the benchmark model, the initial condition for each individual is assumed to satisfy ki; 1 =
i; 1K 1 and si; 1 = i; 1S 1 with
R 1
0 i; 1 di = 1. Let fLt(j) : j 2 [0;1]g1
t=0 denote the supply
of type-j labor assigned by the union. Then, given prices, and the assigned hours worked, each





ci;t + ki;t + si;t =
i;t
i;t 1




with ki;t;si;t  0 for all t.
An aggregation result similar to Proposition 1 holds for the individual utility maximization











t (1   Lt)1 1 

(50)





Given prices and assigned hours worked for each type of labor, fLt(j) : j 2 [0;1]g, the represen-
tative agent chooses a contingent plan fCt;Kt;Stg so as to maximize utility (50) subject to the
sequence of 
ow budget constraints:




and Kt;St  0 with the initial condition K 1;S 1 > 0. Now suppose that fCt;Kt;Stg is the
solution to the representative agent's utility maximization problem. And for each i 2 [0;1],
let ci;t = i;tCt, ki;t = i;tKt, and si;t = i;tSt. Then it is straightforward to show that the
allocation fci;t;ki;t;si;tg constructed in this fashion is the solution to the utility maximization
problem for each individual i. In addition, U0 is proportional to the cross-sectional average of
R 1
0 ui;0 di so that maximizing U0 indeed maximizes average utility of all individuals.
Given this aggregation result, the utility maximization problem with sticky wages can be for-
mulated in exactly the same way as the corresponding problem with a representative household





subject to the 
ow budget constraints (51), short-selling constraints, the labor demand condition
(49), and the Calvo-type restriction on wage adjustments:
wt(j) =
(
~ wt; with probability 1   ~ ;
wt 1(j)
t ; with probability ~ t,
where t  Pt=Pt 1 is the gross in
ation rate in period t. Here, ~ wt denotes the real wage rate in
period t chosen for those types of labor for which the union has the opportunity to re-optimize.
The objective function of the monetary authority in this problem factors in an analogous
way to Proposition 2. It follows that incomplete markets is irrelevant in the following sense:
the optimal monetary policy in our model with uninsured risk is identical to optimal monetary
policy in the corresponding representative agent model. Price stabilization is no longer the
optimal monetary policy for the reasons emphasized in Gal  (2008).
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c 0.7 0.7 2 2
b 0 -0.8 0 -0.8
bc (%) -0.8191 -1.2983 2.0938 7.3301
inf (%) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0006
Table 1: Welfare measures with permanent technology shocks

c 0.7 0.7 2 2
b 0 -0.8 0 -0.8
bc (%) -0.0171 -0.6191 -0.0073 12.2258
inf (%) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0024
Table 2: Welfare measures with temporary technology shocks
i.i.d. persistent
bc (%) 0.0061 11.0914
inf (%) 0.0000 0.0075
Table 3: Welfare measures when the state of technology is constant (
c = 2 and b =  0:8). The
column labeled \i.i.d." reports results for the case where the eective discount factor is i.i.d and
the column labeled \persistent" reports results for the case where it is persistent.
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